

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	ES	5/28	JBC
2	DCI <i>Rec'd 28 May</i>		
3	DDCI		
4	EXDIR SA/IA		ER F&le
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APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
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*C-124*NSA, DIA
review
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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27 MAY 1982


SCW-63/DR

Mr. William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:

(S/SPOKE/NF/SI) The following items of intelligence are provided for your use this week:

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Classified by Multiple Sources

Declassify on _____

Review on 27 May 2002

Extended by _____


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
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4. In a move that may have significant implications for NATO and West German military defense and strategy, Bonn has transferred wartime control of six Home Defense Brigades (HDB) to NATO for both forward defense and reserve force missions. Under the NATO aegis, these units will acquire a greater combat capability when they receive more modern equipment, training and direct attention from command authorities. In turn, the brigades should improve unit morale and esprit de corps. One problem posed by these transfers is the depletion of rear-area forces which are tasked to defend against a Soviet breakthrough of the forward defense line. Thus, it will be necessary either to add troops to the territorial army or to make provisions to increase their combat effectiveness. Otherwise, the remaining rear-area security units will be hard pressed to fulfill their wartime mission program. In any event, enhancing the credibility of NATO's military deterrence -- the advantage of the transfers -- is seen as more than compensating for the short term military problems they will cause.


JAMES A. WILLIAMS
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Director

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